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Scholars of the U.S. Supreme Court have long debated the role, and 
possible influence, of clerks on the decisions their Justices make.  In this 
Paper, we take a novel approach to analyze this phenomenon.  We utilize 
pre-oral argument bench memos sent to Justice Harry A. Blackmun from 
his clerks.  Specifically, we use these memos to determine whether Justice 
Blackmun asked questions of counsel that were recommended by his 
clerks in the memos.  Our data indicate Justice Blackmun often followed 
his clerks’ advice.  Accordingly, we provide another important link to 
demonstrate Supreme Court clerks can and do affect how their Justices 
evaluate cases. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most notorious political scandals in United States history 
involved a break-in of the Democratic National Committee 
headquarters at the Watergate Hotel on June 17, 1972.  Certainly, the 
issues involved in the Watergate scandal are sordid and called into 
question the ethics of President Richard Nixon’s administration, the role 
of special prosecutors, and, more generally, the separation of powers.  
The scandal came to an end when the Supreme Court of the United 
States ruled that President Nixon was required to hand over audio tapes 
(and their transcripts) requested by a special prosecutor.  These tapes 
and transcripts would later prove the White House was involved in the 
crime and in the ensuing cover up. 
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. 
Nixon,1 the Justices knew they had to work quickly given the looming 
constitutional crisis.  Unsurprisingly, this was not an easy task 
considering the range of complex legal issues at play.  Because of the 
condensed timeline (and due to mounting political and public pressure), 
clerks may have taken on an even more important role than usual to 
help their Justices effectively grapple with the difficult constitutional 
issues presented in the case.2  This would have been especially true 
during the Justices’ initial foray into the case: the oral arguments.3   
In this paper, we are interested in Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s 
involvement in this process and in how his clerks prepared him to 
engage with the issues on which the case would turn.4  Specifically, we 
investigate the point at which Justice Blackmun began to think about 
the legal issues presented in the case and how his clerks assisted him in 
 
1.  418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
2.  The Court granted certiorari on June 15, 1974, heard arguments on July 8, 1974, and 
decided the case on July 24, 1974.  See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 683, 690.  
3.  While the Justices had the parties’ briefs, they certainly did not have much time to 
prepare after they were submitted.  Thus, the oral arguments took on added significance, 
especially in light of the empirical evidence that these proceedings help the Justices decide 
issues presented in the cases before them.  See generally TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL 
ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Robert J. 
Spitzer ed., 2004); Timothy R. Johnson, Information, Oral Arguments, and Supreme Court 
Decision Making, 29 AM. POL. RES. 331 (2001). 
4.  For a discussion of how clerks assist Justices in preparing for oral arguments and the 
use of bench memos more generally, see Randall P. Bezanson, Good Old Number Three: 
Harry Blackmun and His Clerks, in IN CHAMBERS: STORIES OF SUPREME COURT LAW 
CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES 326, 326–35 (Todd C. Peppers & Artemus Ward eds., 2012) 
[hereinafter IN CHAMBERS]. 
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preparing for oral argument.  Of course, the answers may never be 
revealed fully, but we can glean some insight by turning to the papers 
Justice Blackmun left behind when he retired from the bench.5  These 
papers, housed at the Library of Congress, contain a variety of writings 
and memoranda about cases the Court decided during Justice 
Blackmun’s tenure including, for our purposes, vital pre-oral argument 
bench memos written by his law clerks in almost every case in which he 
participated from 1970 to 1994.6   
Consistent with the protocol in his chambers, Justice Blackmun 
received a bench memo from one of his law clerks prior to ascending the 
bench for oral arguments in United States v. Nixon on July 8, 1974.7  This 
particular memo (like almost all of his clerks’ bench memos) concluded 
with a list of questions the clerk believed Justice Blackmun should 
consider asking during the proceedings.  Several of the questions 
focused on the facts of the case, while others focused on the Court’s 
authority to hear the case.  Still others focused on precedent 
surrounding executive privilege and the separation of powers.  
Figure 1 depicts three examples that involve these key issues.  
Question 3 was intended for James St. Clair, who argued on behalf of 
President Nixon.  It asked about the scope of the President’s actual 
assertion of executive privilege in the case.  Question 4 was meant for 
the Special Prosecutor, as it focused on court rules and the law 
surrounding the subpoena issued in the case.  Finally, Question 6, also 
for the Special Prosecutor, sought to determine the Court’s authority to 
interfere with presidential actions in light of existing separation-of-
powers jurisprudence. 
The other item of note in these examples is found in Questions 3 
and 6.  Specifically, unlike most of the memos we analyze below, the 
bench memo in Nixon included another important (and interesting) 
feature.  Indeed, the clerk who wrote it actually stated the purpose of 
the question and the possible answer it may elicit.  In short, the memo 
provided a great deal of information for Justice Blackmun as he sat on 
the bench during the arguments.  
 
5.  HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, MANUSCRIPT DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
WASHINGTON, D.C.; see also MANUSCRIPT DIV., LIBRARY OF CONG., HARRY A. 
BLACKMUN PAPERS: A FINDING AID TO THE COLLECTIONS IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
3−7 (rev. ed. 2010), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/eadxmlmss/eadpdfmss/2003/
ms003030.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JQ6P-S3VF. 
6.  Bezanson, supra note 4, at 330–32.  
7.  BLACKMUN PAPERS, supra note 5, at Box 191. 
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Figure 1 
Three Questions Proposed by Justice Blackmun’s  
Clerk in United States v. Nixon 
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For his part, Justice Blackmun seems to have used the memo 
because he edited some of the questions and then asked almost one-
third (3 of 11) of them in open court.  In turn, Justice Blackmun (and 
the full Court) used the answers to these questions in their unanimous 
opinion.  The conclusion we draw is that the clerk who wrote the bench 
memo in Nixon had some influence over Justice Blackmun’s actions at 
oral argument, which in turn affected his thoughts about the substantive 
issues presented in the case.8  
The puzzle for us is whether Justice Blackmun’s behavior in Nixon is 
an anomaly or whether he was likely to follow his clerks’ suggestions for 
questions as a general rule.  While we only have a small sample of cases 
from which to draw for this initial analysis, we can leverage these data as 
a starting point to determine the extent to which such influence existed 
beyond this one, highly salient, case.   
The Article proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we discuss the 
literature that focuses on clerks generally to provide a sense of how they 
may influence their Justices.  From there, we turn to a discussion of the 
small, but rich, literature that concerns clerks and bench memos.  Next, 
we provide a short description of the data we analyze and how we coded 
them.  Finally, we discuss our results and offer a few tentative 
conclusions about our findings. 
II. LAW CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
In the past twenty years, a number of scholars have examined 
whether, and to what extent, Supreme Court clerks affect or influence 
the decisions Justices make.  Much of this work is recent because, until 
about twenty-five years ago, it was virtually impossible to gauge the 
relationship between clerks and their Justices because clerks conduct 
their work in private and are bound by a code of confidentiality that 
binds them even after their Justices have retired from the bench.9  
 
8.  Of course, we cannot fully resolve the issue of behavioral equivalence—meaning it is 
possible Justice Blackmun would have asked these questions absent prompting from his clerk.  
However, while Justice Blackmun could have done so, his clerks wrote questions for him in 
every case in which he participated, which indicates this was the process used in his chambers 
to prepare for oral arguments.  From this fact, we conclude that he relied on his clerks and 
that they therefore played a key role in prompting Justice Blackmun to ask particular 
questions. 
9.  The confidentiality rules are contained in a “Code of Conduct.”  See Todd C. 
Peppers, Of Leakers and Legal Briefers: The Modern Supreme Court Law Clerk, 7 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 95, 104–05 (2012); David Lane, Current Development, Bush v. Gore, 
Vanity Fair, and a Supreme Court Law Clerk’s Duty of Confidentiality, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL 
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However, in 1991, when Justice Thurgood Marshall opened his papers 
to the public, scholars were able to gain a glimpse into the relationship 
between clerks and Justices.10  Since that time, the papers of many other 
Justices have become available, and most of the documents detail the 
behind-the-scenes work done at the Court, including Justices’ 
interactions with their clerks.11 
In this section, we consider the circumstances in which clerks may 
influence their Justices.  Specifically, we focus on influence at the 
certiorari stage and during the writing of the majority opinion.  From 
there, we discuss the use of bench memos by Justices both past and 
present. 
A. Clerks and Agenda Setting 
In terms of the Court’s agenda-setting process at the certiorari stage, 
Saul Brenner and Jan Palmer provided what is probably the first 
systematic assessment of agreement between a law clerk’s 
recommendation and a Justice’s vote.12  Using Chief Justice Vinson’s 
papers, Brenner and Palmer found that Chief Justice Vinson followed 
the recommendation of his law clerks in eighty-six percent of cases.13  
The authors also make clever use of voting data from other Justices to 
show that the clerks’ recommendations likely had a liberal slant during 
(at least) some terms, as evidenced by the level of agreement between 
the recommendations of Chief Justice Vinson’s clerks and the votes of 
 
ETHICS 863, 868 (2005).  Of course, some clerks do violate the confidentiality requirement.  
See, e.g., EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE 
MODERN SUPREME COURT, at v–vi (Penguin 2005) (1998). 
10.  THURGOOD MARSHALL PAPERS, MANUSCRIPT DIVISION, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, D.C.; see also MANUSCRIPT DIV., LIBRARY OF CONG/, 
THURGOOD MARSHALL PAPERS: A FINDING AID TO THE COLLECTION IN THE LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS 2−5 (rev. 2010), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/eadxmlmss/eadpdfm
ss/2001/ms001047.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6MUT-RP6F.  Earlier work relied on the 
papers of Chief Justice Fred Vinson, but the newer archives, particularly those of Justice 
Blackmun, provide a greater window into the relationship between clerks and Justices.  Guide 
to the Frederick Moore Vinson Collection, 1907−1953, Special Collections, U. KY. LIBR., http:/
/kdl.kyvl.org/catalog/xt7msb3wtd0h/guide (last visited Nov. 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.
cc/AAF9-Q5MG. 
11.  For a listing of where to find these papers, see Ronald Collins, Accessing the Papers 
of Supreme Court Justices: Online & Other Resources, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 22, 2013, 10:28 
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08/accessing-the-papers-of-supreme-court-justices-onli
ne-other-resources/, archived at http://perma.cc/E3X8-M47H. 
12.  Saul Brenner & Jan Palmer, The Law Clerks’ Recommendations and Chief Justice 
Vinson’s Vote on Certiorari, 18 AM.  POL. Q. 68 (1990). 
13.  Id. at 74. 
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Chief Justice Vinson’s more liberal colleagues on the Court.14  The more 
general claim in the article, however, is that clerks can and do have an 
effect on how their Justices vote on petitions for certiorari.15   
A few years later, Barbara Palmer conducted a more contemporary 
analysis of the clerks’ role in the agenda-setting process.16  In particular, 
she sought an answer to the question of whether the cert. pool, which 
assigns a single law clerk to prepare one memorandum for all members 
of the pool, influenced the Justices’ votes on petitions for certiorari.17  
Based on the papers of Justice Powell,18 Palmer found four or more of 
the Justices followed the cert. pool recommendation in fifty-five percent 
of all cases during the 1984 and 1985 terms.19  Based on the data, Palmer 
concluded that a pool clerk has the ability to affect whether a case is 
ultimately granted.20  This is a significant finding because, when 
combined with the findings of Brenner and Palmer, it at least suggests 
clerks directly influence the agenda-setting process.  However, both of 
these studies are limited because they focus on a single Justice (Brenner 
and Palmer) or on just two terms (Palmer) of data.  In addition, both 
could only account for cases in which review was granted, not the larger 
universe of cases denied review, because neither Justice Powell nor 
Chief JusticeVinson kept records of Justices’ votes in denied cases. 
Studies of clerk influence at the cert. stage (and studies of agenda 
setting more generally) took a large step forward in 2004, when the 
papers of Justice Blackmun were opened to the public.  Justice 
Blackmun, unlike his predecessors, retained the pool memoranda for all 
cases decided during his tenure on the Court, including the tens of 
thousands of cases denied review.  David Stras was one of the first to 
examine these data, with his analysis of four Terms (1984, 1985, 1991, 
 
14.  Id. at 75–76.  The members of the Court denominated as liberal by Brenner and 
Palmer included Justices Murphy, Rutledge, Douglas, and Black. 
15.  Id. at 68–69, 74. 
16.  Barbara Palmer, The “Bermuda Triangle?” The Cert Pool and Its Influence Over the 
Supreme Court’s Agenda, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 105, 106 (2001). 
17.  Id. at 114.  For a description of the cert. pool, see Ryan C. Black & Christina L. 
Boyd, The Role of Law Clerks in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda-Setting Process, 40 AM. 
POL. RES. 147, 149–50 (2012). 
18.  Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers, 1921–1998, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington 
and Lee University, Lexington, VA; see also A Guide to the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers, 1921–
1998, WASH. & LEE U, http://ead.lib.virginia.edu/vivaxtf/view?docId=wl-law/vilxwl00013.xml;
query=; (last visited Nov. 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/D9ZQ-3ATK. 
19.  See Palmer, supra note 16, at 117–18. 
20.  Id. at 119.  
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and 1992).21  After examining the data, he found an overall agreement 
rate above ninety-eight percent between the Justices and the 
recommendations made in the pool memos.22  Interestingly, when Stras 
considered only the most controversial recommendations, those urging 
the Court to grant review, the agreement rate dropped to just below 
seventy percent—still a very high rate.23  The point is that even when 
Justices are most likely to follow their own ideological predilections—in 
cases of high political and legal salience—the clerks still seem to have a 
large effect on the Court’s agenda-setting decisions.  Again, however, 
while Stras’s analysis improved on earlier work, it still focused on only 
four Terms—two in the Burger Court and two in the early Rehnquist 
Court.24  Thus, a complete understanding of law clerk influence at the 
agenda-setting stage was still not yet in grasp. 
More recently, Ryan Black and Christina Boyd built on prior studies 
to explore the ability of law clerks to alter a Justice’s vote in decisions 
regarding whether to grant or deny certiorari.25  They do so by focusing 
on so-called certworthiness, which assesses the importance of the 
petition and the issues presented; the clerk’s recommendation—that is, 
whether to grant or deny the petition; and the ideological distance 
between the pool clerk and the voting Justice.26  They focus on two 
theories, principal–agent theory and signaling theory, to analyze 
whether clerks influence their own Justice’s decisions and the decisions 
made by other Justices in the cert. pool.27  Application of these two 
theories led them to three hypotheses, the most interesting of which was 
that grant recommendations would be more likely to result in a vote to 
grant if the ideology of the voting Justice was similar to that of the pool 
clerk.28  To test their hypotheses, Black and Boyd still focus only on four 
 
21.  David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the 
Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947 (2007) (reviewing TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF 
THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 
(2006); ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF 
LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006)). 
22.  Id. at 993. 
23.  Id.  
24.  See id. at 977. 
25.  Black & Boyd, supra note 17, at 147. 
26.  See id. at 155. 
27.  See id. at 150–53. 
28.  See id. at 155. 
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Terms (1986, 1987, 1991, and 1992), but they utilized a much larger 
sample of more than 2,000 votes from 305 petitions for certiorari.29 
Their results suggest an ideological component to the influence of 
clerks.  In particular, when clerk recommendations to grant review come 
from an ideologically distant chambers, the voting Justice is less likely to 
follow the recommendation than if the recommendation came from his 
or her own law clerk or the clerk of an ideological ally.30  The bottom 
line is that clerks do have some influence at the cert. stage, and the cert. 
pool is an effective means of exercising that influence.  However, the 
influence and effect of the cert. pool seem to turn on ideological 
relationships. 
Overall, the combination of the descriptive and systematic analyses 
discussed here suggests that clerks can and do play a role in the Justices’ 
decisions about which cases to take.  However, agenda setting is not the 
only, or even most important, part of the decision-making process in 
which clerks may influence Justices.  We turn next to decisions on the 
merits. 
B. Clerks and Decisions on the Merits 
While setting the Court’s agenda takes up a large amount of time for 
Justices and their clerks, the Justices’ most important task is to decide 
the merits of the constitutional, statutory, and other cases they have 
accepted for review.  At the merits stage, clerks may also have some 
influence on the Justices.  In fact, they may have influence on two 
aspects of the process: the votes cast by the Justices on the disposition of 
the case and the reasoning adopted in opinions.  This section considers 
the possibility of clerk influence on both decisions.  
As with decisions on the Court’s certiorari votes, clerks may also 
have influence on the votes cast by Justices on the merits.  Again, testing 
this hypothesis was virtually impossible prior to the public availability of 
the Justices’ papers and, in particular, the papers of Justice Blackmun.  
Nevertheless, work did exist in this area.  The first study to analyze the 
impact of clerks on the Justices’ votes cast on the merits examined the 
 
29.  Id. at 156. 
30.  Id. at 162; see also Ryan C. Black, Christina L. Boyd & Amanda C. Bryan, Revisiting 
the Influence of Law Clerks on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda-Setting Process, 98 MARQ. 
L. REV.75, 88 (2014). 
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papers of Justice Harold Burton.31  In that study, Jan Palmer and Saul 
Brenner analyzed Justice Burton’s votes on the merits—that is, whether 
to affirm or reverse in a case—in an effort to determine whether he 
voted in accordance with his clerks’ recommendations.32  Specifically, 
they analyzed Burton’s conference votes on the merits during the 
Vinson Court era (1946–1948).33  They found that Burton’s agreement 
rate with his own clerks exceeded his agreement rate with his 
colleagues.34  The converse was also true: his clerks agreed with him 
more often than they did with his colleagues.35   
Like Palmer and Brenner, Todd Peppers and Christopher Zorn 
explored the extent to which clerks influence their Justice’s votes on the 
merits.36  Unlike Palmer and Brenner, however, Peppers and Zorn 
examined votes across Justices and multiple Terms.37  Empirically, they 
modeled the probability a Justice would cast a liberal vote as a function 
of both the Justice’s policy preferences and the partisanship of his or her 
law clerks.38  Across nearly a dozen different model specifications, 
Peppers and Zorn uncovered a statistically significant relationship 
between aggregate clerk partisanship for a particular Term and a 
Justice’s propensity to vote liberally, even after controlling for a 
Justice’s preexisting ideological tendencies.39  They found, for example, 
that a Justice who goes from a chambers full of Republican clerks to a 
chambers full of Democratic clerks would be thirty-three percent more 
likely to cast a liberal vote.40 
The point is that the votes of Justices correlate highly with their 
clerks’ ideology, although Peppers and Zorn concede their findings do 
not support “any particular causal model of that influence.”41  While 
 
31.  Jan Palmer & Saul Brenner, Research Note, The Law Clerks’ Recommendations 
and the Conference Vote On-The-Merits on the U.S. Supreme Court, 18 JUST. SYS. J. 185, 186 
(1995). 
32.  Id.  
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. at 190. 
35.  Id. at 192. 
36.  Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court 
Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51, 53 (2008). 
37.  See id. at 70–71. 
38.  Id. at 70–75. 
39.  Id. at 75. 
40.  Id. at 74–75. 
41.  Id. at 75.  In fact, like Peppers and Zorn, we do not make any normative judgments 
about whether clerks exercise too much influence over the decisions made by Justices.  After 
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compelling, these findings do not demonstrate a direct effect by law 
clerks on Justices.   
In addition to works that focus on the votes of the Justices using raw 
data, Artemus Ward and David Weiden provided anecdotal evidence to 
determine the extent to which clerks may influence Supreme Court 
decision making.42  Sometimes, former clerks indicated they had no 
influence on their Justices.  For example, John P. Frank, who clerked for 
Justice Black, said he witnessed Black “ma[ke] approximately one 
thousand decisions, and I had precisely no influence on any of them.”43  
On the other hand, Robert von Mehren, who clerked for Justice Reed, 
indicated clerks in his chambers would discuss complex cases together 
and that, during the course of the discussions, Reed would sometimes 
change his views of the case.44 
Perhaps the most interesting anecdote of clerk influence on a merits 
vote (and on the substance of a case) comes from the files of Justice 
Powell.45  In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,46 a case involving 
whether a city may ban movies that depict nudity in outdoor theaters, 
Justice Powell initially sided with the City of Jacksonville.  However, 
based upon the memorandum depicted in Figure 2, it is clear he changed 
his mind because of a discussion with his clerks.  According to the 
memo, two of his clerks made clear to him that it is not bad for children 
to be exposed to nudity. 
 
  
 
all, there is nothing wrong with a Justice changing his or her mind based on substantive 
discussions with the clerks, particularly if it is the discussion itself, and not the persuasion 
exerted by the clerks, that leads to the change. 
42.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 21, at 150–51. 
43.  Id. at 152 (quoting JOHN P. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE: THE SUPREME COURT IN 
AMERICAN LIFE 118 (1958)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
44.  Id. (quoting Interview by William Cooper with Robert von Mehren (June 11, 1985), 
in STANLEY F. REED ORAL HISTORY PROJECT, https://nyx.uky.edu/oh/render.php?cachefile
=1985OH121_Reed22_Mehren.xml, archived at http://perma.cc/WYX5-VNHX). 
45.  See supra note 18.  One of the authors, Tim Johnson, obtained this memo from the 
archives of Justice Powell. 
46.  422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
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Figure 2 
Memo from Justice Powell in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville 
 
Finally, several studies analyze perhaps the most controversial 
element of law clerk influence: the role of clerks in drafting the Court’s 
opinions.  The first of these studies, conducted by Paul Wahlbeck, James 
Spriggs, and Lee Siegelman, examined draft opinions circulated by 
Justices Powell and Marshall during the 1985 Term to identify linguistic 
“fingerprints” that may be attributable to law clerks.47  Knowing which 
clerk wrote each of the drafts allowed the authors to determine whether, 
and the extent to which, Justices altered the drafts written by their 
clerks.48  Interestingly, their work revealed significant differences 
between the two chambers.49  Indeed, while there was not an overly 
discernible influence from Justice Powell’s clerks on draft opinions, 
there were clear stylistic attributes that could be traced to Justice 
Marshall’s clerks.50  Thus, while clerks may influence how opinions are 
written (and the content of those opinions), the amount of influence 
varies across chambers. 
Nearly a decade later, Jeffrey Rosenthal and Albert Yoon 
approached the same topic from a longitudinal perspective.51  In so 
 
47.  Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II & Lee Sigelman, Ghostwriters on the Court? 
A Stylistic Analysis of U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Drafts, 30 AM. POL. RES. 166, 168 (2002).  
One potential weakness of stylistic variability scores is that clerks can adopt their Justice’s 
preferred writing style over time.  Thus, to the extent such variability scores decrease over 
time, studies relying on stylistic variability could underestimate the role of law clerks in the 
opinion-drafting process.   
48.  Id. at 175, 180. 
49.  Id. at 178. 
50.  Id. at 182. 
51.  Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Ghostwriting: Authorship on the 
Supreme Court, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1307 (2011) [hereinafter Rosenthal & Yoon, Judicial 
Ghostwriting]; see also Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Albert H. Yoon, Detecting Multiple Authorship 
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doing, they used sixty-three function words (e.g., also, from, such, when, 
and would) to identify a Justice’s personal writing style and then 
determine whether that style exhibited significant variability across 
opinions.52  Specifically, they calculated “variability scores,” which 
provided evidence about whether “the law clerk ha[d] received at least 
part of the Justice’s writing responsibilities.”53  The variability scores 
across all Justices ranged from a high of 3.85 for Justice O’Connor to a 
low of 2.11 for Justice McReynolds.54  Moreover, the variability scores 
were consistent with anecdotal accounts of the extent to which certain 
Justices wrote their own opinions.55  For example, Justices Scalia and 
Douglas, both of whom are known for drafting many of their own 
opinions, had relatively low variability scores among the modern 
Justices included in the study.56  The findings comport with the 
conventional wisdom that Justices vary in their use of clerks in the 
opinion-drafting process.57   
In general, then, research suggests clerks, to varying degrees, 
influence both the substantive decisions made by Justices and the 
opinion-drafting process.  Although the scholarly literature has not 
shown a direct effect, it does provide evidence of clerk influence.  In the 
next section, we extend the research on clerk influence to a new focus: 
pre-oral argument bench memos. 
C. Clerks and Bench Memos 
The memo in Figure 2 provides a good point of reference for our 
relationship of interest: the extent to which pre-oral argument bench 
memos may influence a Justice’s behavior on the bench.  To date, 
scholars have not analyzed these memos in any systematic way.  Despite 
this gap in the literature, scholars and former clerks have written about 
the potential importance of bench memos.  
 
of United States Supreme Court Legal Decisions Using Function Words, 5 ANNALS APPLIED 
STAT. 283 (2011). 
52.  Rosenthal & Yoon, Judicial Ghostwriting, supra note 51, at 1314–15. 
53.  Id. at 1315. 
54.  Id. at 1319–20.  A higher variability score, according to Rosenthal and Yoon, was 
consistent with the hypothesis that the Justice relied more heavily on clerks to draft majority 
opinions.  Id. at 1318. 
55.  Id. at 1320. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. at 1320–21. 
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Justices in the early twentieth century did not seem to use bench 
memos in the same way that they are used today—if they even used 
them at all.  For instance, Justice Louis Brandeis was  
emphatic in refusing to permit what many of the Justices today 
require, a bench memorandum or précis of the case from their 
law clerks to give them the gist of the matter before the 
argument.  To Justice Brandeis . . . this was a profanation of 
advocacy.  He owed it to counsel—who he always hoped . . . 
would be advocates to—to present them with a judicial mind 
unscratched by the scribblings of clerks.58 
Similarly, Justice Frankfurter rarely asked his clerks to write bench 
memos.  Todd Peppers, for example, wrote that, occasionally  
Frankfurter had his law clerks write bench memos in cases that 
interested him.  When asked to quantify the number of bench 
memoranda he drafted, [Andrew] Kaufman replied, “I wouldn’t 
say it was a steady diet.”  Other former law clerks [to Justice 
Frankfurter] do not mention bench memoranda as part of their 
job duties.59 
Justices Frankfurter and Brandeis were typical of how Justices used 
their law clerks through the end of the Vinson Court.60  However, when 
Earl Warren became Chief Justice in 1953, he changed the norms of 
how clerks interacted with their Justices.  In his own chambers, Chief 
Justice Warren clearly had his clerks prepare memos for him, both on 
petitions for certiorari and on the merits of cases.  Jesse Choper, a 
former Warren clerk, explained the process:  
First, we wrote a short memo to the Chief on each cert 
petition—some might be very brief, just a few pages; others 
could run to more than twenty pages.  Second, we wrote 
considerably longer bench memos discussing the briefs in cases 
 
58.  Todd C. Peppers, Isaiah and His Young Disciples: Justice Louis Brandeis and His 
Law Clerks, in IN CHAMBERS, supra note 4, at 67, 72–73 (quoting DEAN ACHESON, 
MORNING AND NOON 96–97 (1965)). 
59.  See Todd C. Peppers & Beth See Driver, Half Clerk, Half Son: Justice Felix 
Frankfurter and His Law Clerks, in IN CHAMBERS, supra note 4, at 141, 147 (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Interview by Todd C. Peppers with Andrew Kaufman). 
60.  See Brenner & Palmer, supra note 12, at 69–70. 
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scheduled for oral argument.  (We made a recommendation to 
the Chief in both sets of memos.)61 
More generally, Peppers posited that, “[u]pon his arrival at the 
Supreme Court, Earl Warren adopted a clerkship model in which law 
clerks continued the traditional role of writing cert. memoranda but 
assumed two new duties: preparing bench memoranda and drafting 
opinions.”62  In fact, Peppers suggested that, when new Justices joined 
the bench during the Warren Court era, each adopted some variation of 
the new clerkship model, including Justice Charles Whittaker.63  As 
biographer Craig Alan Smith noted, 
[d]uring Whittaker’s first full term his two clerks, Alan Kohn and 
Ken Dam, performed duties familiar to most law clerks from that 
time: they read petitions for certiorari and summarized them for 
the justice, and they wrote bench memoranda on the cases 
accepted for oral argument.64 
Indeed, the bench memoranda in Justice Whittaker’s chambers were 
longer than in other chambers, and “averaged ten to fifteen pages in 
length.”65 
Despite this new norm on the bench, there was clear variation in 
whether Justices, over the latter half of the twentieth century, had their 
clerks write bench memos.  For instance, prior to the Rehnquist Court, 
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Powell, Warren, 
White, and Whittaker required bench memos from their clerks.66  On 
the other hand, Justices Brennan and Stewart only occasionally asked 
the clerks to prepare bench memos.67  Finally, Justices Fortas and 
Harlan II rarely assigned such duties to their clerks.68  Interestingly, by 
the time Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 1986,  
[a]ll justices except Justice Stevens routinely assigned their clerks 
the task of preparing the first draft of opinions, and the majority 
 
61.  Jesse H. Choper, Clerking for Chief Justice Earl Warren, in IN CHAMBERS, supra 
note 4, at 263, 265. 
62.  PEPPERS, supra note 21, at 151. 
63.  Id. at 151–52. 
64.  Craig Alan Smith, Strained Relations: Justice Charles Evan Whittaker and His Law 
Clerks, in IN CHAMBERS, supra note 4, at 243, 249–50. 
65.  PEPPERS, supra note 21, at 161. 
66.  Id. at 190. 
67.  See id. at 158, 162, 190–91. 
68.  Id. at 190. 
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of the justices depended on bench memoranda to prepare them 
for oral argument.  There is no evidence to suggest that any of 
these practices have changed during the first term of the Roberts 
Court.69  
The point is that the role of law clerks appears to have steadily 
expanded over time.70   
Similar to Justice Blackmun, Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor 
required their clerks to draft bench memos that included proposed 
questions for them to ask during oral argument.  Peppers revealed that,  
[i]n the majority of cases set for oral argument, Justice Ginsburg 
requires her clerks to prepare written bench memoranda.  The 
purpose of the bench memoranda is to highlight the salient issues 
and provide a framework for resolving the appeal.  The 
memoranda include a summary of the dispositive legal issues, 
suggested questions for oral argument, and a recommended 
disposition.71  
Justice O’Connor often chatted with her clerks about individual cases, 
but before these discussions, the clerks would write memoranda that 
included “a case summary, analysis of the briefs, a personal 
recommendation as to case disposition, and suggested questions for oral 
argument.”72   
Finally, we return to the object of our study—Justice Blackmun—
who finished his career during the first eight Terms of the Rehnquist 
Court.  Like many of the Justices discussed above, Blackmun asked his 
clerks to write bench memos.  As Randall Bezanson wrote, “In Justice 
Blackmun’s chambers, a bench memo was prepared by a clerk (the 
clerks tended to divvy up the memos, too) for each case to be argued 
during the term.”73  These memos are the focus of our analysis.  
Specifically, we test for a law clerk effect by comparing the questions 
Justice Blackmun’s clerks recommended he should ask during oral 
arguments with whether he actually asked those questions. 
 
69.  Id. at 191. 
70.  In contrast to many of the Justices during the modern era, Justice Stevens did not 
ask his law clerks to prepare bench memoranda prior to oral argument.  Rather, he followed 
the “old” clerkship model—that is, the one that prevailed prior to the Warren Court.  Even 
so, Justice Stevens required his clerks to pay attention to the record, briefs, and lower court 
opinions in preparation for informal talks with him about each case.  See id. at 196. 
71.  Id. at 199. 
72.  Id. at 197–98. 
73.  Bezanson, supra note 4, at 330. 
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III. DATA  
Although there are now a greater number of studies examining the 
role Supreme Court clerks play in the decisions that Justices make, the 
evidence has not produced a smoking gun, so to speak, that definitively 
establishes clerk influence at any stage of the decision-making process.  
We believe that such evidence may exist in limited form in the way in 
which Justice Blackmun’s clerks prepared him for oral argument.  
Indeed, as the memos in Figures 3 and 4 suggest, his clerks wrote 
questions for him in advance of oral arguments.  These questions, and 
the answers they elicited, would have influenced the lens through which 
Justice Blackmun viewed the case.  In this section, we explain the data 
we use to support our hypothesis. 
As we note in the introduction, Justice Blackmun kept a plethora of 
memos, drafts, and other correspondence in his papers now housed at 
the Library of Congress.  It has taken scholars at least a decade to fully 
examine the data contained in those papers—the obvious as well as the 
hidden.  The hidden gems have produced some of the most interesting 
findings on how, for example, oral arguments affect the decisions 
Justices make.74  Included among those gems are the final pages of the 
bench memos in merits cases such as United States v. Nixon, for it is on 
these pages that Justice Blackmun’s law clerks proposed oral argument 
questions for his consideration. 
To determine the extent to which Justice Blackmun used the 
questions proposed by his law clerks, we examine the bench memos in a 
small sample of forty cases.  In each case, the questions proposed by the 
law clerks can be found on the last page of the bench memo.75   
We used a straightforward process for gathering and analyzing these 
data.  First, we examined all the bench memoranda available to us.76  We 
then determined which memos had the final pages still attached.77  In 
 
74.  See, e.g., Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs II, The 
Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99 (2006); 
Eve M. Ringsmuth, Amanda C. Bryan & Timothy R. Johnson, Voting Fluidity and Oral 
Argument on the U.S. Supreme Court, 66 POL. RES. Q. 429 (2012). 
75.  We obtained the small sample during the collection of data on another project.  See 
Black & Boyd, supra note 17, at 156.  
76.  We are grateful to Amanda C. Bryan for collecting the data and for realizing their 
significance when she shared them with us.  We are also grateful to Ryan C. Black and 
Christina L. Boyd, whose various analyses of law clerks led us to these memos and to this 
project. 
77.  Because these memoranda were collected for another project, the final page usually 
was not photographed.  The examples we have here, and the forty cases we consider, include 
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addition, we ensured there was a case identifier on the memo (a docket 
number, a case name, or both) and dropped from the dataset all cases 
that could not be identified.   
Second, we used Justice Blackmun’s fastidious notes of what 
transpired during oral argument to determine whether he actually asked 
the questions prepared by his clerks.  Specifically, he placed checkmarks 
next to the questions he asked and left blank those he did not ask.78  In 
United States v. Brewster,79 for example, Justice Blackmun’s clerk 
proposed eight questions.  As Figure 3 demonstrates, however, Justice 
Blackmun only asked six of those questions—as the checkmarks before 
numbers 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 indicate. 
However, there is clear variation in the extent to which Justice 
Blackmun followed the advice of his clerks.  In fact, Figure 4 indicates 
that, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,80 he did not ask any of the questions in 
the bench memo.  However, he did craft an additional question he 
decided to ask during the argument.  The point is that Justice Blackmun 
certainly followed his clerks’ advice, but not on every question and not 
in every case. 
Third, we examined the transcripts of oral arguments to verify that 
Justice Blackmun asked each of the checked questions.81  In addition, 
we had research assistants review the transcripts to determine whether 
Justice Blackmun asked any of the questions that he did not check.  In 
particular, they compared questions in the bench memo with the actual 
questions asked during the oral argument sessions.  A combination of 
these two coding processes led to our dataset, which includes 230 
possible questions Justice Blackmun could have asked across the forty 
cases in the sample.  The next section provides some descriptive analysis 
based on these data. 
  
 
all of the cases in which the bench memos were photographed in their entirety.  
78.  Justice Blackmun also occasionally added questions in his own handwriting and 
recorded the answers that the attorneys gave in response. 
79.  408 U.S. 501 (1972). 
80.  407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
81.  We used the transcripts from the Oyez Project.  THE OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT 
CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, http://www.oyez.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/7MDB-259Q. 
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Figure 3 
Bench Memo Questions from United States v. Brewster 
 
Note: The checkmarks indicate which questions Justice Blackmun asked 
during oral argument. 
Figure 4 
Bench Memo Questions from Argersinger v. Hamlin 
 
Note: The checkmarks indicate which questions Justice Blackmun asked 
during oral argument.  
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IV. RESULTS 
While we do not provide a statistical model in this iteration of the 
project, the data we employ here are quite convincing.  Note, first, that 
Justice Blackmun did not always heed the advice given to him by his 
clerks.  In fact, most of the time, he did not ask the questions his clerks 
submitted.  However, he did not fully ignore their recommendations 
either.   
Specifically, of the 230 questions suggested by his clerks, Justice 
Blackmun asked 94, which means he used more than 40% of them.  This 
suggests a relatively strong clerk effect.  Indeed, if a clerk submits a 
question and the Justice actually asks that question, then we can 
reasonably infer the clerk had some influence over the Justice’s 
behavior.  Nevertheless, the data are only suggestive and do not 
conclusively establish the direct-clerk-influence hypothesis.   
However, combining our finding with existing research provides 
additional support for the hypothesis.  In one study, Ringsmuth and her 
co-authors indicate Justice Blackmun did not begin to prepare his own 
thoughts about a case until just a few days before the oral argument.82  
In contrast, most of the bench memos were written much earlier in the 
process.  For instance, while the argument in Gooding v. Wilson83 
occurred on December 8, 1971, the clerk sent the bench memo for that 
case to Justice Blackmun on September 17, 1971, nearly three months 
earlier. The point is that the clerks wrote their questions for Justice 
Blackmun days, if not months, before Justice Blackmun examined the 
issues in the case.  Although that fact does not guarantee Justice 
Blackmun would not have asked the same questions without prompting 
by his clerks, it is highly suggestive.84  In addition, the fact that Justice 
Blackmun only occasionally added his own questions (see Figure 4) 
indicates he was usually satisfied with his clerks’ recommendations.85   
So far, the data establish that Justice Blackmun generally acted on 
the advice of his clerks during oral arguments.  This alone indicates 
clerks can directly influence the actions their Justices take.  In fact, it 
may be the best evidence to date, given the timing of the process and the 
 
82.  See Ringsmuth, Bryan, & Johnson, supra note 74, at 431. 
83.  405 U.S. 518 (1972). 
84.  See supra note 8. 
85.  Interestingly, in our sample, Justice Blackmun never crossed out any of the clerk-
suggested questions.  While he may have done so in other cases, there is no theoretical reason 
to believe he did so.  Of course, this presents an empirical question that is easily verifiable 
with another sample of bench memos. 
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sheer number of suggested questions used by Justice Blackmun.  Of 
course, we cannot make a direct causal claim until we control for other 
factors that may have affected his behavior.   
The next step is to determine if there is any connection among the 
types of questions Justice Blackmun asked and whether the answers to 
those questions influenced his opinions.  With respect to the types of 
questions, we analyzed the 94 clerk-written questions Justice Blackmun 
asked based on Johnson’s taxonomy of possible question types.86  It 
allowed us to test whether Justice Blackmun’s clerk focused on the type 
of questions that we would expect a policy-minded, strategic Justice to 
ask.87  Justices who exhibit these tendencies tend to ask questions about 
policy issues, applicable precedents (the key institutional rule Justices 
follow), and the views of external actors.  Justice Blackmun asked the 
types of questions we would expect a strategic, policy-minded Justice to 
ask.  In fact, more than half of the questions in the sample were about 
matters of policy (51 of the 94 questions he asked), while just over 10% 
focused on precedent (12 of the 94 questions).  Interestingly, he asked 
many fewer questions about the views of external actors (only 2 
questions), but the pattern is similar to what Johnson found for other 
policy-minded and strategic Justices.88  The bottom line is that Justice 
Blackmun’s clerks sensed that Justice Blackmun should think about the 
public policy involved in a case as well as about how a case fit within 
existing precedent.  Justice Blackmun, in turn, asked these types of 
questions at oral argument. 
Finally, we consider how Justice Blackmun used the answers to his 
questions in his opinions.  Unfortunately, in our sample, Justice 
Blackmun was the opinion’s author in only a few cases.  In the few 
opinions he did author, we found only one question submitted by a clerk 
that found its way into one of his opinions.89  While this preliminary 
finding may cut against the direct-clerk-influence hypothesis, we cannot 
make any definitive claims about the link between the questions and the 
 
86.  JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 33 tbl.2.1.  Johnson codes for six possible categories of 
questions, including those about policy content, the preferences of actors beyond the Court, 
precedent, the facts of the case, constitutional issues, threshold issues, and the implications of 
a case.  Id. at 32–33.  As with Johnson’s original coding, we double counted questions if they 
fell into more than one category (precedent and policy for instance). 
87.  See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). 
88.  A significant portion of the questions focused on legal (constitutional) issues or on 
the facts of the case.  The latter category was Justice Blackmun’s second-most-asked question 
type. 
89.  Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972). 
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opinions because we simply do not have enough data.  For now, we 
realize that this aspect of the analysis will have to await a more complete 
analysis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Justice Blackmun was particular about the process he used to make 
decisions during his tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court.  The bench 
memos we analyze show that his clerks used bench memos as a vehicle 
to prepare him for oral arguments and that Justice Blackmun used the 
questions submitted by his clerks as the basis for asking questions of the 
attorneys in the case. 
Of course, our analysis is not definitive.  First, we analyze only a 
single Justice.  Second, we analyze only a small sample of cases drawn 
mostly from cases arising early in Justice Blackmun’s tenure on the 
Court.  Even so, we have no reason to believe that Justice Blackmun’s 
processes changed over time.  Future research should take these initial 
findings and expand them with a more systematic analysis across Terms 
and even across Justices, if possible.  Accordingly, we suggest scholars 
gather and analyze these data to provide a more robust picture of clerk 
influence at the oral-argument stage of the Court’s decision-making 
process.  For now, we have revealed a new wrinkle in the quest for fully 
understanding the relationship between Justices and their clerks. 
 
